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Abstract
“Biodiversity offsetting” is a novel approach to nature conservation, through which it is 
intended to dissociate economic development from negative biodiversity impacts. Biodiversity 
offsets involve the quantification of the predicted biodiversity losses associated with a given 
development project, and subsequently, the provision of full ecological compensation measures 
elsewhere by the associated developer, e. g., habitat restoration. The objective is no net loss 
of biodiversity overall.
Here, we develop an offset experiment in the style of a classic economic game (‘trading in a 
pit market’), which can be implemented for teaching or training purposes. Our purpose was 
twofold: first, to illustrate to non-experts how biodiversity offsetting is supposed to work; 
and second, to gather a novel form of data on how offset policies might play out in practice. 
We ran the experiment with three different groups of students in 2016: two at the University 
of Copenhagen in Denmark, and one at the Swedish Agricultural University in Sweden.
The experiment provided an engaging means for teaching students about the concepts 
underlying biodiversity offsets. Furthermore, the trade data collected from students in 
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running the experiment, with and without a hypothetical biodiversity offset policy in place, 
revealed some key principles around offsetting which have been noted in real world policy 
outcomes.
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Introduction
Nature conservation is considered an important goal by the global community, as 
evidenced by the fact that 196 nations are now party to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity [6] and associated conservation targets. However, many of the activities 
associated with industrial development and economic growth are known to have 
negative impacts upon nature [14]. As a result, governments, large businesses and 
financial institutions worldwide are keen to identify mechanisms through which 
biodiversity loss can be dissociated from economic development [13]. One increasingly 
widespread option for potentially doing so is to implement some form of ‘no net loss’ 
biodiversity policy principle, which includes allowing developers to implement 
‘biodiversity offsets’.
Biodiversity offsets basically involve the quantification of predicted biodiversity 
losses associated with a development project, and subsequently, the provision of full 
ecological compensation measures elsewhere by the associated developer, e. g., by 
habitat restoration [3]. Biodiversity offsets are intended to be used as a last resort, 
after reasonable efforts have been made to avoid, minimise and remediate project 
impacts wherever feasible [8]. The underlying assumption is that, if all biodiversity 
impacts of development can be (i) avoided, (ii) minimized, (iii) remediated and then 
finally (iv) offset (where actions i–iv represent a preferred sequence of measures 
together known as the ‘mitigation hierarchy’; Fig. 1), then there will be no net loss 
(NNL) of biodiversity overall. 
Modern NNL-type policies, and thus biodiversity offsetting, have been in place 
since at least the 1970s [13]. In this article, we focus upon biodiversity offsets (hence-
forth, ‘offsets’).
The potential outcomes of offset policies over time and at a landscape scale can be 
predicted through mathematical simulation models [e. g. 2; 10; 15]. Furthermore, pre-
vious studies have captured the stated preferences of different stakeholder groups in 
terms of the desired outcomes of biodiversity offsets [4; 5; 12; 17]. However, the few 
countries that have witnessed the widespread implementation of offsets (such as Aus-
tralia, Germany, and the US [13]) do not have sufficiently accurate monitoring data to 
allow any general demonstration of the actual outcomes of offsetting [e. g. 1]. This is 
a problem in terms of: (a) understanding how offsets might work in practice; (b) under-
standing whether they are likely to be effective; and, (c) explaining to those without 
any previous expertise how an offset policy could and should be implemented.
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Fig. 1. Schematic of the ‘mitigation 
hierarchy’. Net biodiversity value is 
plotted on the y-axis. A development 
project is predicted to result in net losses 
(dark shaded bar). A sequence  
of avoidance, minimisation, remediation 
and finally offset actions (all light shaded 
bars) are then implemented to mitigation 
and compensate for predicted 
development impacts. The final result, 
ideally, is that net biodiversity value = 0 
(i. e. ‘no net loss’) or better [3; 8; 13]
Рис. 1. Схема «иерархии смягчения». 
Чистое значение биоразнообразия 
нанесено на ось y. Проект развития 
предположительно приведет к чистым 
убыткам (темно-серая область).  
Последовательность действий  
исключения, минимизации, исправления 
и, наконец, смещения (все светло-серые 
полосы) затем применяются  
для смягчения последствий и компенсации 
прогнозируемых воздействий развития. 
Конечный результат, в идеале, заключается 
в том, что чистое значение  
биоразнообразия = 0 (т. е. «без чистых 
убытков») или лучше [2; 7; 13]
Here, we developed an offset experiment in the style of a classic economic game, 
which can be played by students or employees (for teaching or training purposes, 
respectively). The purpose was twofold: primarily, to illustrate to non-experts how 
offsetting is supposed to work (i. e. point (c) above); and secondarily, to gather a 
novel form of data on how offset policies might play out in practice (i. e. points (a-b) 
above). 
Experimental method
We used the ‘trading in a pit market’ game outlined by Holt [11], which has been used 
extensively to teach students about the classic macro-economic concepts of supply 
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and demand, and market equilibrium. Holt divided a given class of students into two 
groups, ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’, which then all traded playing cards of different nominal 
values by bartering in an open market. The value of each trade was recorded over 
several rounds of trading, and at the end the trade data from the game is used to 
demonstrate how markets settle into a predictable equilibrium. 
Offsets were designed in a number of countries as a form of tradable permit [18], 
and so it was appropriate to adapt an existing market trading game as a model for the 
implementation of an offset policy. We therefore adapted the experiment outlined by 
Holt [11] slightly such that our class of students was divided equally into ‘developers’ 
and ‘landowners’, and each trade resulted in the modification of a plot of land demar-
cated on a map. A real case study landscape located in Vejle Ådal and surroundings 
west of Vejle (Figs. 2 and 3). Vejle Ådal is a river valley formed by the last glacial 
periods some 115–15 thousand years ago. The glaciers followed the valley systems 
previously formed back in the older part of the Quaternary or earlier. The glaciers 
deepened the valley and runoff from melted ice and snow eroded the valley bottom 
 
Fig. 2. Vejle Ådal and surroundings west 
of Vejle. The white areas indicate areas 
of High Nature Value, and parcels  
of between 1 and 5 ha which in this 
exercise are either considered suitable 
development or off-setting
Рис. 2. Вайле-Адаль и окрестности  
к западу от Вайле. Белые области 
обозначают районы с высокой  
природной ценностью и участки  
от 1 до 5 га, которые в этом упражнении 
считаются подходящими для развития 
или смещения
Tyumen State University Herald
24  
and sides. Today the valley is an important biodiversity hotspot and includes wetland 
habitats and dry grassland on steep slopes of high nature value (HNV). Despite this 
the area is not included in the Natura 2000 areas network. Fig. 2 illustrates the case 
area, which is situated west of Vejle. The white areas indicate areas which have been 
assessed as holding HNV [7]. 
Parcels of approximate similar size (1-5 ha) within and outside the HNV areas are 
marked. We assume that each land parcel is owned by one owner and each land parcel 
within the HNV areas (white polygons) are interesting development areas, most likely 
conversion into intensively managed farm land, or housing development if allowed by 
the municipality. Fig. 3 illustrates the location of the case area in Denmark.
The students then played two different games in succession, in which they first 
traded plots of land for development without an offset policy, and then traded plots 
of land for development with a requirement to also implement offsets (see below). 
We ran the experiment with three different and independent sets of students, all of 
whom: had had no previous training in biodiversity offset policy; ranged from under-
graduate to doctoral level; and represented a range of nationalities and both genders. 
The students were being taught on three different and entirely unrelated courses: two 
at the University of Copenhagen in Denmark, and one at the Swedish Agricultural 
University in Sweden.
Details: Game 1
We gave each developer a red numbered playing card, and each landowner a black 
numbered playing card. Some cards were removed from the deck(s), and all remaining 
 
Fig. 3. Location of the case area,  
Vejle Ådal
Рис. 3. Расположение исследуемого 
места, Вайле-Адаль
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cards had a number. Each unit on the card represents one “unit” of trade that can be 
exchanged between developers and landowners, and all participants kept the number 
on their card secret as private information. This was to resemble a real market situation 
in which only landowners knew their true costs, and the minimum price at which they 
would sell (elaborated below). The cards were distributed to students at random, from 
a selection of cards designed such that the average across all cards handed out was 
6. For example, the following cards would be used for a class with 18 student 
participants:
Black (spades or clubs): 2, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6, 7, 8.
Red (hearts or diamonds): 10, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 6, 5, 4.
Trading: all developers and landowners met in the centre of the room and were 
allowed to freely negotiate a price for the plot of land owned by each landowner, 
based on the value of the cards in their hand, for a 5-minute trading period. Prices 
had to be multiples of 0.5. When a developer and landowner agreed on a price, they 
went together to the game administrator (the authors) and reported the exchange, 
which upon approval was then announced to the whole class. Trades were approved 
when the agreed price was at or between the minimum price of the landowner (seller) 
and the maximum price of the developer (buyer). They then turned in their cards, and 
the developer chose a white land parcel on the map (see case study) to colour in red 
(known as the ‘development’). Afterwards, both were out of the game for that period. 
There were four periods of trading.
Landowners: could sell a single card during a trading period. The number on 
the card is the dollar cost that incurred if a sale is made. Landowners were required 
to sell at a price no lower than the cost number on the card. Earnings on the sale 
were calculated as the difference between the price negotiated and the cost number 
on the card. If no sale was made, nothing was earned. So — suppose that the card 
had a value of 2 and a sale price of $3.50 was negotiated. The landowner would 
earn $3.50 – $2 = $1.50. They would not have been allowed to sell at a price below 
$2 with that card.
Developers: could each buy a single development plot during the trading period. 
The number on their card is the dollar value received if a purchase is made. Devel-
opers were required to buy at a price no higher than the value number on their card. 
Their earnings were calculated as the difference between the value number on their 
card and the price negotiated. Again, if no purchase was made, nothing was earned. 
So — suppose that the card was a 9 and a purchase price of $4 was negotiated. The 
developer would earn $9 – $4 = $5. They would not have been allowed to buy at a 
price above $9 with that card.
Recording Earnings: After each period, the administrator collected all cards, 
and students calculated their earnings whilst cards were redistributed at random. 
Each student’s total earnings equalled the sum of earnings for units traded in all 
periods, and we used the Earnings Record Form from Holt (1996; Table 1). Land-
owners used the left side of the Earnings Record Form, and developers used the 
right side.
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Details: Game 2
The approach in Game 2 was similar to those in Game 1, but with a major difference. 
Every time a developer bought a card from a landowner, they also had to buy a second 
card as an “offset” for the development. When a developer had both bought a first 
card as a development and also a second card as an offset, they could then come to 
the administrator as before to report both at the same time. The developer coloured 
Table 1 Таблица 1
Earning Record Sheet  
(copy on the reverse  
of the instruction sheet)
Лист для записывания 
поступлений (копия обратной 
стороны листа с инструкциями)
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one white land parcel on the map red (the ‘development’) and one white land parcel 
on the map green (the ‘offset’).
Additional rules for Game 2 were:
  developers could not purchase a card for the next ‘development’ until they 
had purchased an offset for the previous development;
  developers could buy the two cards (development and offset) in any order;
  developers could buy the two cards (development and offset) from the same 
landowner, or different landowners; and,
  the developer had to use the same card to buy both the development and the 
offset cards.
Results
Trades performed by all three sets of students — labelled the ‘INC’ (Denmark), ‘JSM’ 
(Sweden) and ‘NLP’ (Denmark) groups, approximately converged to the theoretically 
predicted market equilibrium (= 6; [11]) under Game 1 (Fig. 4).
The market equilibrium value was significantly lower on average in Game 2 
(= 4.0 ± 0.5), when the offset policy was implemented, than in Game 1 (= 5.5 ± 0.3). 
The number of trades was also significantly lower on average (Table 2).
We noted that participants in each class voluntarily (i. e. without being prompted) 
requested to play a third version of the game, in which developers were permitted to 
increase the value on their card so as to make purchasing two plots of land (a devel-
opment and an offset) more straightforward. In each case, the third version of the 
game was played as requested.
 
Fig. 4. Results of each round of Game 1, 
for all participants. Theoretical market 
equilibrium value = 6. (A) INC course 
(Denmark), (B) JSM course (Sweden), 
(C) NLP course (Denmark)
Рис. 4. Результаты каждого раунда 
игры 1 для всех участников.  
Теоретическое рыночное равновесное 
значение = 6. (A) Курс INC (Дания), 
(B) Курс JSM (Швеция), (C) Курс NLP 
(Дания)
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We mapped development and offset locations chosen by the first of the three 
students groups over the three versions of the game (Fig. 5).
Discussion
First and foremost, we received highly positive feedback from those taking part in 
the game. As mentioned, all student groups requested to play additional (third) versions 
of the game, suggesting enthusiasm for the exercise. A number of students expressed 
the perspective that it was interesting (as those studying environmental science) to 
both be exposed to economic theory, and thought-provoking to be put in the position 
of the developer. The course director for the first group of students (INC) contacted 
us to state that the group had very much enjoyed the experiment. As such, we suggest 
that the games presented here could potentially be used as an engaging tool for teaching 
classes about offsetting and NNL theory. Additionally, the games perhaps provide a 
useful method for communicating the concept behind offset policy to those in a region 
where an offset policy is to be introduced.
Table 2 Таблица 2
Trades completed by all three groups 
of students for Games 1 and 2,  
in terms of average trade value and 
average number of trades completed
Торги, проведенные всеми тремя 
группами студентов для Игр 1 и 2, 
с точки зрения средней торговой 
стоимости и среднего числа 
завершенных торгов
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Fig. 5. Example map of development 
and offset locations, chosen by the INC 
class. (A) Game 1, where red dots = 
location of developed sites. (B) Game 2, 
where red dots = location of developed 
sites, and green dots = location of 
corresponding offset sites
Рис. 5. Пример карты местоположений 
разработки и смещения, выбранных 
классом INC. (A) Игра 1, где красные 
точки = местоположение разработанных 
участков. (B) Игра 2, где красные точки = 
местоположение разработанных  
участков, а зеленые точки = расположение 
соответствующих смещенных участков
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Furthermore, despite the small sample size and hypothetical nature of the game, 
the outcomes of the experiment reported above reveal some important points about 
biodiversity offsetting. For instance, the introduction of a biodiversity offset policy 
resulted in a restricted supply of land and fewer trades (‘developments’) being com-
pleted (Table 2). This highlights one of the intended outcomes of offsetting: that an 
incentive is created to avoid developing certain types of land (which can be targeted 
at specific habitat types, in real world policy) in the first place. By no means does this 
mean development stagnates: as can be seen, trades continued in Game 2 despite the 
financial constraints placed upon developers by our overly simplistic offset policy. 
Rather, it allows policymakers to use a market mechanism to encourage developers 
to leave alone certain high conservation value habitats and develop habitats with 
lower conservation value [11].
The fact that students requested a change in the rule midway through Game 2 
provides an insight into demands made of policymakers by developers in real world 
offset policies. In particular, the request from student ‘developers’ to change the 
value on their cards is analogous to real world developers seeking subsidies or a 
lifting of certain development constraints in response to biodiversity offset policy. 
Such requests are seen in practice, and may even result in offset policies taking a 
number of years to mature [16]. Less productively, a number of the students partici-
pating in the games proposed more unscrupulous approaches to facilitating develop-
ment, such as breaking the rules of the game and sharing information amongst them-
selves (insider trading). If care is not taken in policy development and implementation, 
offsetting can lead to problems such as non-compliance, or the creation of various 
perverse incentives [3; 9].
Finally, we noted that student participants instinctively tended to place offsets 
adjacent or close to development sites, without being primed to do so (Fig. 3). This 
reveals a common principle of offsetting, the proximity rule, i. e. offsets should be 
located as close as possible to the development for which they compensate. The 
proximity rule is not only considered an element of best practice in offsetting, it also 
often reflects the preferences of local stakeholders [4].
In conclusion, we consider our biodiversity offset ‘trading in a pit market’ game 
to have some potential as both a teaching tool and as a means for gathering data to 
support development of NNL theory — and encourage other teachers and trainers to 
experiment with its implementation.
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Аннотация
«Компенсация ущерба биоразнообразию» является новым подходом в области ох-
раны природы, с помощью которого можно избавиться от негативного воздействия 
экономического развития на биоразнообразие. Компенсация ущерба включает в себя 
количественную оценку прогнозируемых потерь биоразнообразия, связанных с опре-
деленным проектом развития, и дальнейшее применение разработчиком мер полной 
экологической компенсации в других местах, например, в виде восстановления среды 
обитания. Целью применения метода компенсации ущерба являются достижение чи-
стых нулевых потерь биоразнообразия в целом.
Цитирование: Булл Дж. У. Демонстрация результатов применения политики компенса-
ции ущерба биоразнообразию с использованием приемов классической экономической 
игры / Дж. У. Булл, Н. Стренж // Вестник Тюменского государственного университета. 
Экология и природопользование. 2017. Том 3. № 1. С. 20-34. 
DOI: 10.21684/2411-7927-2017-3-1-20-34
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33Демонстрация результатов применения политики компенсации  ...
Экология и природопользование.  2017.  Т. 3. ¹ 1
В данной статье рассматривается эксперимент использования классической эконо-
мической игры (‘trading in a pit market’ — торговля в биржевой яме), которая может 
быть использована в процессе обучения и тренингов. Мы преследовали двоякую 
цель: во-первых, показать неспециалистам, как работает система компенсации ущерба 
биоразнообразию; и, во-вторых, разработать новую форму сбора данных для при-
менения этой схемы на практике. В 2016 г. мы провели эксперимент с тремя груп-
пами студентов: двумя из Университета Копенгагена в Дании и одной из Шведского 
сельскохозяйственного университета.
Эксперимент проводился с целью обучения студентов основам компенсации ущерба 
биоразнообразию. Кроме того, данные, собранные студентами в рамках эксперимента в 
условиях гипотетического применения и неприменения политики компенсации ущерба 
на местах, позволили выявить некоторые ключевые принципы, связанные с компенса-
цией, которые были отмечены в результатах применения реальной мировой политики.
Ключевые слова
Компенсация ущерба биоразнообразию, нулевые потери, биржевая яма.
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